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INTRODUCTION

While every investment, domestic or foreign, entails commercial and political risks, the risks of international investment,
particularly in developing countries, are generally greater and
more complex than those for domestic investments. Of course,
some commercial risks are greater in international investments.
For example, it is often more difficult to obtain information on
the creditworthiness of a foreign purchaser than a domestic purchaser. On the whole, however, the commercial risk of both domestic and foreign investments can often be calculated with
some degree of precision. Experts can anticipate likely changes
in transportation costs, for example, and foreign currencies can
usually be hedged to minimize transfer exposure.
The political risks of international investment, on the other
hand, particularly in developing countries, are generally without
parallel in a domestic environment. For domestic investments,
there is often a so-called "regulatory risk"' that the government
will change the rules of the game in a way that will adversely
affect the economics of the investment. However, the nature of
this risk is only roughly similar to foreign political risk. In the
United States and other industrialized countries, there are comprehensive and tested laws that permit an investor to make a
reasoned judgment as to regulatory risks, and there are legal
structures and impartial judiciaries to resolve disputes in accordance with those laws. This is usually not the case for real political risks, particularly in developing countries.
Therefore, investors and lenders often seek to obtain insurance against the political and commercial risks of foreign transactions. This article analyzes the types of insurance that may be
available. First, it outlines the elements of political and commercial risks and U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) risk insurance. Then it deals with insurance available
from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), and other government-sponsored and private political risk insurers. Finally, it
provides tips for negotiating and drafting the three documents

1. See e.g., Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 666 P.2d
329 (1983).
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crucial to insurance coverage: the underlying investment contract, the application for insurance, and the insurance contract
itself.

II.
A.

ELEMENTS OF RISK

Political Risk

Political risk itself has not changed much in several millennia. There are sovereigns that have a certain number of rights
and usually a greater number of powers which can be exercised
within their jurisdictions. However, the evaluation of political
risk and the application of that evaluation to business decisions
as well as operations have changed considerably in recent years.2
Many large multinational companies even have in-house managers of political risk, often as a part of the treasurer's office, but
sometimes as a separate insurance department.The evaluation of political risk has also developed theoretical underpinnings. Scholars and business people have evolved
models by which to evaluate the nature, likelihood and seriousness of political risks. Basically, the best-known models require
potential investors to identify and attach values to specific factors that can affect an investment. At a minimum, these models
can be useful in focusing management's attention on special
risks. However, at some point, the models become subjective.'
For example, the numerical value that is attached to a particular
risk in a political risk equation reflects its significance to the investor, although reasonable people may differ. Perhaps as a result of this subjectivity, experience indicates that evaluation of
political risk is treated by most managers more as an art than a
science. One writer has indicated that even managers who have
models available for evaluating political risks often do not actu2. See CHARLES M. NEWMAN II & JAMES CZECHOWICZ, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES AND PRACTICES (Financial Executives Research Foundation 1983);
FARIBORZ GHADAR

TECHNIQUES

ET AL.,

MANAGING

INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL RISK:

STRATEGIES AND

(Ghadar and Assoc. 1983).

3. Daniel A. Sharp, Business Environment Assessment, in

GHADAR,

supra note 2, at

7.
4. Stephen J. Kobrin, PoliticalRisk: A Review and Reconsideration,10 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 67 (Spring/Summer 1979); Alan C. Shaprio, Managing Political Risk: A Policy
Approach, 16 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 63 (Fall 1981); YAIR AHARONI, THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS (Harvard Univ. 1966); Sharp, supra note 3, at 7.
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ally use the models when making decisions.'
B.

Three Basic Categories of Political Risk

A foreign investor faces three basic categories of political
risks:
1. The risk that political violence, such as war, revolution,
insurrection, terrorism or civil strife will occur. These are events
over which the host government often has relatively little control. The host government has relatively limited responsibility
under international law for resulting losses to foreign investors,
unless those acts that are not actually committed by the state
can nevertheless be attributed to the state;'
2. The risk that the host government will undertake deliberate acts, including expropriation and interference with contractual rights, that will result in the effective taking of the investor's property rights. These are events over which, almost by
definition, the host government does have control and is generally responsible under international law for resulting losses to
foreign investors; 7 and
3. The risk that the host government will restrict the conversion of local currency into foreign exchange. This is an event
over which the host government usually has a great deal of control, but it has relatively little responsibility under international
law for resulting losses to foreign investors.8

5.

FRANK, POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE SURVEY: ANALYSIS OF MARKET RESULTS

(Univ.

City Science Ctr., Phila., July 7, 1973); Sharp, supra note 3, at 16.
6. See, e.g., Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10)
INT'L L. COMM'N 30, U.N.
Doc, A/CN. 4/Ser. A/1980/Add. 1; Acts of a "Puppet State" or of Local de Facto Gov-

at 59, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 YB.

ernment, 8 Whiteman DIGEST § 12, at 835-36; Lena Goldfields (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 5 Ann.
Dig. 3, 426 (1924-30) (Award of Sept. 2, 1930); (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 82, 86 (1926)
(government failed to punish its own nationals who engaged in acts against the personal
safety of foreigners).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] §188 cmt. b, (1965); see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed., 1970); Sixth Report by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur on

Responsibility of the State For Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens - Reparation of the Injury, 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 37-47, 51, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1961/Add.l.; Letter from Secretary Hull to the Mexican Ambassador
(Aug. 22, 1938), reprinted in Property Rights, 3 Hackworth DIGEST §288, at 655-65.
8. See, e.g., Lighthouse Arbitration (France v. Greece), 23 Int'l L. Rep. 341 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1956); Taxation, 4 Moore DIGEST §540, at 20; Burns H. Weston, "Constructive
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The risks related to political violence and exchange restrictions are relatively straightforward, but the types of deliberate
acts of the host government that may cause losses to foreign investors require some elaboration.
C. Deliberate Acts of the Government
The host government may engage in acts that present a
range of political and commercial risks to the foreign investor.
First, a host government can nationalize the investment. Outright nationalization is obviously a political act undertaken by a
host government in the exercise of its sovereign power. The
United States and other industrialized countries take the view
that nationalization is lawful only if it: (1) is undertaken for a
public purpose; (2) is not arbitrary or discriminatory; and (3) is
promptly, adequately and effectively compensated. Many developing countries have more expansive views of what a government can lawfully do and more restrictive views of what an expropriating government has to pay as compensation.'
Second, a host government can regulate or tax a foreign investment. Regulation and taxation are political acts in the sense
that they are undertaken for policy reasons by a host government in the exercise of its sovereign power. Regulation and taxation are presumptively lawful exercises of the police power inherent in a sovereign (a power of which many states, including
the United States, regularly avail themselves) even if they deprive the investor of substantial rights in, or control of, the investment or of the return on the investment.

Takings" under InternationalLaw; A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation", 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975).
9. The position of the developing countries is based primarily on nonbinding resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, settlements at less than full compensation, and the views of a minority of scholars. United Nations resolutions are not sources
of international law themselves and are not evidence of changes in custom and practice,
particularly since the actual practice of States in various investment treaties adheres to
the traditional standard. Settlements are, almost by definition, not sources of law, but
decisions to resolve disputes outside the law. Only scholarly opinions are a possible
source of international law, and, I submit, not nearly enough to overcome an accepted
international standard. See e.g., Chorzow Factory (Merits), p. 128 P.C.I.J., (ser. A), No.
17; Texas Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya (Merits), Jan. 19,
1977, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1976); Libya African Oil Co. v. Libya (Merits), April 12, 1977, 20
I.L.M. 1 (1981); L.C.J. Stat. art. 38.
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Third, a host government can breach, or cause a government-controlled entity to breach an agreement with an investor.
Such breaches can be either political or commercial acts depending upon a number of factors.
Finally, the host government can act, or cause a government-controlled entity to act in a commercial capacity as a
shareholder, director, manager or creditor of an investment, and
by such commercial' acts deprive the investor of substantial
rights in, or control of its investment or of its return on its investment. It is becoming increasingly common for governments
or government-controlled entities to participate in commercial
ventures. 10 So long as the government is legally entitled to act as
a commercial participant, such acts should be deemed to be
commercial, not political acts, even if they result in a loss to the
investor.
D.

Definition of an Expropriatory Act

The most obvious political risk is that of expropriation.
Typically, an expropriatory act is defined as an unlawful act of a
government, or on behalf of a government, that results in the
effective taking of all or substantially all of the investor's property rights in its investment. This general definition may vary
from contract to contract, and the definition of an expropriatory
act is often heavily negotiated in insurance contracts between
private investors and insurers.
However, it should also be noted that a taking need not be
labeled as such to be an expropriation under international law.
An expropriation need not be explicitly embodied in a nationalization decree. It can be a constructive expropriation as well. 1
Similarly, an expropriation need not be the result of a single
event. A series of events that result in substantial loss of an investor's rights in an investment can amount to an expropriation.
12
This is called a "creeping" expropriation.
10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C: § 1603 (1988).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 192 Illus. 1, at 572 (1965); see ARGHYRIOS A.
FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 34 n.12, (1962); see Louis B.
Sohn and R.R. Baxter, Responsibilitiesof States for Injuries to the Economic Interests
of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1961).
12. OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, reprinted in
G.W. Haight, International Organizations OECD Resolution on the Protection of For-

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/3

8

1993]

POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE

E. Commercial/Political Distinction in Deliberate Acts of
Government
1. Deliberate Acts
In the real world, acts by a government do not easily and
clearly fall within only one of the four categories. Particularly,
distinctions between political and commercial acts can be difficult to determine. Any commercial act can have political elements. It is especially academic to try to distinguish commercial
from political acts in non-market economies. The failure of a
government-controlled or regulated entity to deliver supplies, for
example, could be a commercial failure or a deliberate political
act.
In principle, the distinction is made more difficult because
the motivation of a government, even if discernible, is not relevant. A government is responsible under international law for its
acts and its effects, not for its intentions. 13 However, in a dispute over whether an act is commercial or political, the government's expression of its intentions can be a decisive factor in the
determination of whether an act is genuinely regulatory or
expropriatory."
The distinction between commercial and political acts, although difficult, is often crucial to the assessment of risk. A
company should be able to judge in a reasonably effective manner the likelihood and effect of lawful regulatory or commercial
acts. For example, it should know that tax rates can change and
be expected to evaluate in advance the effect that such changes
can have on the economics of an investment. More importantly,
the distinction between commercial and political acts is often
crucial to insurance coverage because certain types of insurance
are only available to cover political risks, not commercial risks.

eign Property, 2 INT'L LAW 326, 331 (1968).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 192 (1965); "Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens," reprinted in Sohn & Baxter,
supra note 11, at 548, 553.
14. See Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
Am. Arb. Assoc. Case No. 16 10 0137 76 (1978) (Bergan, Arb.).
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F. Elements Of Commercial Risk
Commercial risks vary with the four commercial stages of an
investment: (1) planning and development, (2) construction, (3)
start-up of operations, and (4) operations.
1. PlanningAnd Development
The investor has relatively small financial exposure in the
planning and development stage itself. However, there are a
number of risks that must be addressed so that they will not
adversely affect the investment at a later stage. Therefore, it is
at the planning stage that the question of insurance should be
addressed, even though the risks to be insured against arise only
in later stages. For example, insurance is useful, or even necessary, to obtain financing for the construction stage.
In order to identify risks, an international contract will
often provide that the parties will undertake or fund feasibility
studies acceptable to all parties. 15 Financial risk for feasibility
studies can be reduced by applying for subsidized funding. Such
funding is available from the World Bank for qualified investments that are beneficial to developing countries. For U.S. companies, funding may be available from OPIC and the Agency for
International Development for investments in developing countries that would likely increase United States exports.16 Additionally, developing countries themselves will sometimes
provide
7
funds or other assistance for feasibility studies.1
2.

Construction

Real financial risk for the investor generally begins at the
construction stage. Construction lending is usually with recourse
15. Chinese law might even require that joint ventures produce feasibility studies.
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (1979), Art. 9,
reprinted in COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CONCERNING FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (1980) [hereinafter China Joint Venture].
16. Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988); see William A.

Delphos, Washington's Best Kept Secrets (1983), reprinted in

INSIDE WASHINGTON: THE

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT RESOURCES

17. See

(1988).

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CORPORATION, INVESTING IN

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

'(1978);

INVESTMENT POLICIES IN SEVENTY-THREE

COUNTRIES

(Price Waterhouse, 1982).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/3
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to the investor because lenders normally will not assume the risk
of a failure to complete an investment. The primary risks are
technical ones and the principal commercial exposure is unforeseen increases in projected costs. It is possible to reduce these
risks by a well-drafted force majeure '8 clause and by contractual
provisions that take account of any possible delays in
construction.
3. Start-Up of Operations
At the start-up of the operations stage, the principal commercial risk is whether the investment can operate at the costs
and to the specifications made when the investment was financed. If it cannot, it is likely that the investment will have to
be restructured in order to produce enough earnings to service
debt, pay expenses and earn a return.
4. Operations
At the final operations stage, the investment revenues
should be sufficient to service debt, pay operating costs and provide a return to the investors. The principal commercial risks
during the operations stage are:
1. Nondelivery of supplies and raw materials; unforeseen increases in the costs of supplies;
2. Raw materials or additional borrowing;
3. Failures of marketing;
4. Failure to produce goods of sufficient quality or with sufficiently reliable delivery;
5. Insufficient or unreliable demand;
6. Lack of trade financing for purchasers; and
7. Uncollectibility of receivables.19

18. A force majeure clause protects the parties of a contract in the event that a part

of the contract cannot be performed due to causes which are outside the control of the
parties and could not be avoided by exercise of good care.
19. See Goodwillie, Financing for Foreign Sites Projects: Methods of Risk Avoidance, Am. Bar Assoc. Seminar on Counseling the U.S. Multinational (1985).
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Insuring Against Political and Commercial Risks

In principle, one can say with some accuracy that any risk is
insurable if one is prepared to pay the premiums. However, in
practice, not all risks are insurable. Coverage against the basic
political risks described above is available from one or more entities but coverage against many commercial risks is not usually
available. Moreover, special commercial risk coverages are not of
much utility in day-to-day business decisions and operations.
Such coverages are sometimes not available at all, not usually
timely and are almost always expensive.
Therefore, with respect to commercial risk insurance the
question must be: against which commercial risk does the insurer offer coverage? It is possible to obtain insurance against:
(1) certain risks of construction, basically property and casualty
coverage for Acts of God but usually only for physical damage,
rather than unforeseen increases in cost caused by Acts of God;
(2) risks of project completion, that is a successful start-up of
operations, involving someone other than the insured; and (3)
certain risks of operation. Insurers are generally prepared to
cover the reliability of a supplier, the creditworthiness of a purchaser, or the collectibility of receivables.20
Insurance for commercial risks of operation is not always
available to cover purely market risks such as cost increases, insufficient demand or risks of technical failures. Insurance for
commercial risks of operations may not be available to cover the
effects of those commercial acts over which the insured has control. For example, it is unlikely that an investor could obtain
insurance against losses caused by the failure of its own marketing or by its own increased borrowing or cost overruns.
III.
A.

OPIC

Structure

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was
chartered by Congress to provide support for private American
business investment in developing countries. OPIC is a corpora-

20. This subject is discussed further in sections on the United States Export-Import
Bank and private insurance companies, and accompanying footnotes.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/3
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tion wholly owned by the United States government. Its obligations are backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States. In 1971, OPIC commenced operations. OPIC insures
against losses caused by expropriatory acts, inconvertibility, as
well as war, revolution, insurrection and civil strife and business
interruptions caused by such. Additionally, OPIC has special insurance programs to cover standby letters of credit and performance bonds.
In 1985 and 1988, Congress amended OPIC's authority in
the following ways:
1. OPIC was authorized to provide a new' '21category of insurance
for losses due to "business interruption.
2. The maximum contingent insurance liability that OPIC is
permitted to have outstanding to any one investor, usually a
bank, was increased from ten percent to fifteen percent "in order to provide increased flexibility for those entities which have
used investment guarantee programs and which are likely to
''
reach the ten percent ceiling before 1989. 22

3. OPIC can operate in a country "only if the country in which
the project is to be undertaken is taking steps to adopt and implement laws that extend internationally recognized worker
rights, as defined in Section 2462(a)(4) of Title 19, to workers in
that country (including any designated zone in that country) unless the President determines that such activities [by OPIC]
would be in the national economic interests of the United
States" and reports his determination to Congress.23
4. The ceiling on OPIC's total investment guarantees was raised
from $750 million to $1.5 billion.2"
However, in 1985, Congress rejected two administration requests for changes to OPIC's statutory provisions. Congress refused to exempt OPIC's risk pooling arrangements with OPIClike organizations in other countries from certain policy requirements in OPIC's authorizing legislation, for example, any project

21. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(D) (1988), OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
1985, HR. CONF. REP. No. 428, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-14 (1985).
22. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(d) (1988); OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 156, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985).
AMENDMENTS ACT OF

23. 22 U.S.C. § 2191a (a)(3) (1988).
24. OPIC Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-461, Title V, 102 Stat. 2268-21,
(1988).
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assisted by OPIC must have positive developmental effects on
the host country and have no adverse effects on the United
States economy. The Senate Committee Report underscored its
refusal by noting "that OPIC's primary mission, to foster the
flow of investment to friendly developing countries without
causing injury to the United States, is one which should apply to
whatever activity OPIC undertakes. ' '12 Also, Congress refused
OPIC's request that the definition of "eligible investor" be left
to the discretion of OPIC's board of directors.2 6
OPIC is a corporation wholly owned by the United States
government. Its obligations are backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States.2 7
The business and affairs of OPIC are managed by a board of
directors consisting of fifteen members and OPIC's president.2 8
The chairman of the board is also the Administrator of the
Agency for International Development. The vice chairman is the
Deputy United States Trade Representative. Eight members of
the board appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate are from the private sector. The board also has representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce and
29
Labor.
B.

Scope of OPIC Coverage

It is important to emphasize at the outset that OPIC covers
only political risks, not commercial risks. OPIC's purpose is to
encourage investment by United States companies in developing
countries by providing political risk insurance, loans and loan
guaranties. One principal part of OPIC's operations is its political risk insurance, which covers risks of war, revolution, insurrection and civil strife, inconvertibility, expropriation and business interruptions caused by such. OPIC's expropriation
coverage can also encompass arbitrary drawdowns on bonds, letters of credit and other guarantees of performance, payment,

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

S. REP. No. 156, supra note 22, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
22 U.S.C. § 2197(c) (1988).
22 U.S.C. § 2193(b) (1988).
Id.
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etc., if caused by political acts.30
OPIC's coverage is divided into two classifications:
1. The "current insured amount" is the amount of coverage actually in effect at a given time; and
2. The "standby insured amount" is assurance that OPIC will
provide future coverage, up to the maximum amount specified in
each contract.
OPIC will normally make insurance available for earnings
valued at up to twice the amount of the initial insured investment. A premium is charged for the outstanding amount of the
investment and related earnings, if any, and in some cases, there
is an additional charge for the differences between coverage limits and the outstanding amount. OPIC can insure an investment
for up to twenty years and coverage of at least fifteen years is
common. During that time, the insurance cannot be cancelled by
OPIC.
For an equity investment, coverage applies to the equity interest. For a loan, coverage applies to scheduled principal and
interest payments. For other types of investments, the specific
assets contributed by the investor, as set forth in the contract,
represent the insurable investment.
C.

Eligibility

OPIC is an agency of the United States government, and
there are limitations on investors and investments eligible for
OPIC's programs based upon policy considerations.3 1 The most
significant limitations are described in the following paragraphs.
Eligible investors include United States citizens, entities incorporated in the United States if substantially beneficially owned
by United States citizens, and entities incorporated outside the
United States if more than ninety-five percent beneficially
owned by United States citizens or such eligible corporations. 2

30. 22 U.S.C. § 2194 (1988).
31. 22 U.S.C. § § 2191, 2197 (1988).
32. 22 U.S.C. § 2198(c) (1988).
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1. Investments
OPIC can provide insurance coverage only for investments
in less developed friendly countries."3 OPIC must give preferential consideration to investment projects in "less developed
countries" that have average per capita income of $984 or less in
1986 United States dollars, and must restrict its activities with
respect to investment projects in "less developed countries" that
have average per capita income of $4,269 or more in 1986 dollars.3 4 By the end of 1991, OPIC was operating in 122 eligible
countries."8 Until the end of the cold war, Communist countries
were specifically excluded, except where designated by statute."6
Statutory exceptions have been made for Yugoslavia, Poland,
Hungary, other East European countries, and China.-7 OPIC has
subsequently been authorized to operate in the former Soviet
Union and has signed agreements with all members of the former Soviet Union, except Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, with
which it expects to sign agreements shortly.
2.

Additionality

OPIC should assist investments for which the insurance is
"additional." ' In principle, OPIC should provide insurance only
if the investment would not proceed without that insurance. In
practice, OPIC satisfies this policy by issuing its insurance only
to investors who register their projects with OPIC prior to entering into an irrevocable commitment to invest. If investors have
not registered their projects, they might still be eligible for coverage if they can clearly demonstrate that they would not have
entered into the investment without the insurance. For example,
the investment contract might provide that the investment is

33. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2) (1988).
35. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT

CORPORATION,

1991

ANNUAL REPORT

[hereinafter

1991 ANNUAL REPORT].

36. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(a) (1988),
37. 22 U.S.C. § 2199(0 (1988).
38. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988); ARTHUR YOUNG AND CO., STUDY OF
OPIC ASSISTANCE TO U.S. PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING

[hereinafter

ARTHUR YOUNG STUDY OF ADDITIONALITY].

ADDITIONALITY OF
COUNTRIES

(1982)

"Additionality" is a bureaucratic

word that, loosely translated, means "necessary."
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contingent upon obtaining insurance from OPIC. 9
3.

Eligible Countries

OPIC is required to enter into "satisfactory arrangements"
with a host government before it can offer insurance programs.
Typically, these arrangements take the form of bilateral investment guarantee agreements. These agreements establish the basic relationship between OPIC and the host government.40
Among other things, the agreements provide that the host government must specifically approve projects to be insured by
OPIC, that OPIC will be subrogated to the rights of its insureds
and that disputes between OPIC and the host government will
be resolved by international arbitration in accordance with international law. OPIC has bilateral agreements with more than
135 developing countries. Almost three-fourths of these bilateral
agreements were entered into by OPIC's predecessor, a division
of the Agency for International Development. 4' For many years,
OPIC was unable to do business in most of Latin America because many Latin American countries subscribe to the so-called
Calvo Doctrine,' 2 the effect of which is to make it impossible to
enter into arrangements for subrogations and arbitration as provided for in the bilateral agreements.43 OPIC can now do business in most Latin American countries."
OPIC is prepared to insure an investment controlled by a
host government only if there is a "high probability" that the
39. This point is discussed further under "Negotiating and Drafting Points," below.
40. OPIC's bilateral agreements are different from the Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) being negotiated by the United States Department of State. BITs are agreements

that are intended to protect all United States investors. See

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF

1 BILATERAL TREATIES FOR INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT (1978). By
contrast, OPIC's bilateral agreements are intended to affect directly only the relationship
between OPIC and the host government.
41. See, e.g., Investment Warranties Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Somali Republic, 1964, Effected by Exchange of notes, T.I.A.S. 5512 at
1.
42. A doctrine articulated by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, it denies a complainant the right to seek diplomatic protection from its home government where doing so
would give the complainant more rights and protections than are afforded to a national
of the host country where the investment is made.
43. See, e.g., Allison, Capital Controls in Latin America, in INT'L FIN. L. 31 (Rendell
ed., 2d ed. 1983).
44. Countries not included are Mexico and Peru.
COMMERCE,
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project will be commercially viable. This higher standard implies
a presumption that governments are inclined to sponsor investments for other than commercial reasons.
4. New Development
The investment must be a "new" investment.4 5 However,
this can include the modernization or expansion of existing facilities. Also, it can include acquisitions to "privatize" governmentowned entities and acquisitions from private parties if they are
accompanied by substantial additional investment for improvements or modernization.
5.

Loan-to-Value Ratio

OPIC can generally cover only up to ninety percent of an
investment's value, to a maximum of $100 million per project.
There are case-by-case exceptions to the dollar maximum and
OPIC will insure up to one hundred percent of loans by lending
institutions to unrelated parties.4 6
6.

Effects on U.S. Economy

OPIC cannot assist in any investments in "run-away" plants
or in any investments that would result in a significant net loss
of United States jobs. 47 Also, OPIC may not assist in any investment that involves so-called "performance requirements" that
"would reduce substantially the positive trade benefits likely to
8
accrue to the United States from the investment."'
D.

ExpropriatoryActs

To constitute an expropriatory act, an act of the government must be outside the government's legitimate role as a commercial participant or beyond the scope of its legitimate regulatory authority. 9 For certain situations in which the potential
45. ARTHUR YOUNG STUDY OF ADDITIONALITY, supra note 38.
46. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(0 (1988).
47. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(k), 2191(1) (1988).
48. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(m) (1988).
49. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Insurance Contract 234, KGT 12-85
[hereinafter OPIC 12-85 Contract], Art. IV, Section 4.01 of the OPIC contract defines
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difficulty of distinguishing between a commercial and a political
act is inherent, OPIC has revised its expropriation insurance to
cover noncompliance with the dispute resolution provisions of
an agreement.5 0 For example, in China, if the government's pervasive involvement would make distinctions between political
and commercial acts particularly difficult, OPIC would compensate an insured investor if a Chinese entity:
1. Fails to participate in the dispute resolution procedure;
2. Participates, but refuses to pay an award or judgment rendered against it under the dispute resolution procedures; or
3. Obtains an award or judgment in its favor by means of fraud,
corruption or coercion, or obtains an award that is not supported
by substantial evidence on the record.51
1.

War, Revolution, Insurrection and Civil Strife

For most investors, political violence coverage ' extends to
damage or destruction of physical assets only. For institutional

total expropriation as
an act or series of acts [that] satisfies all of the following requirements:
(a)the acts are attributable to a foreign governing authority which is in de facto
control of the part of the country in which the project is located;
(b)the acts are violations of international law (without regard to the availability of
local remedies) or material breaches of local law;
(c)the acts directly deprive the Investor of fundamental rights in the insured investment (Rights are fundamental if without them the Investor is substantially
deprived of the benefits of the investment); and
(d)the violations of law are not remedied (§ 9.101.9) and the expropriatory effect
continues for six months.
Expropriation of funds is compensable where (a), (b) and (d) above are met and the
act or series of acts "directly" results in preventing the Investor from (1) repatriating the
funds; and (2) effectively controlling the funds in the country in which the project is
located. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. IV, Section 4.02.
50. OPIC covers "normal" expropriations (such as nationalizations or overt takeovers) in any event.
51. OPIC has not done business in China recently because of human rights
violations.
52. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. VI, Section 6.01 of the OPIC Contract defines political violence as:
a violent act undertaken with the primary intent of achieving a political objective,
such as declared or undeclared war, hostile action by national or international
armed forces, civil war, revolution, insurrection, civil strife, terrorism or sabotage..
However, acts undertaken primarily to achieve labor or student objectives are not
covered, compensation will be paid only for permanent losses that are the direct
and immediate result of the political violence.
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lenders and others the coverage also extends to liability for payments, such as payments for principal and interest on loans or
under technical assistance agreements, when events of war,
revolution, insurrection or civil strife cause a default. However,
OPIC cannot cover defaults on payment obligations of a host
government. OPIC has taken the position that insuring payments having the full faith and credit of the host government
would, in ,effect, be underwriting the commercial obligations of
that foreign government.
Insurance against civil strife was added relatively recently
to cover events that do not fit within the traditional definitions
of war, revolution or insurrection. Losses due primarily to labor
and student disputes are specifically excluded from civil strife
coverage.5"
2.

Inconvertibility

Coverage against inconvertibility 54 of local currency insures
that local currency can be converted into dollars on the terms in
effect at the time the insurance is issued. This is not coverage
against devaluation, which involves the risk that local currency,
although convertible, will be worth less in foreign exchange at
the time of conversion than at the time of investment. Devaluation is deemed a commercial risk, not a political risk.
For OPIC's inconvertibility coverage, an investor must establish that at the time OPIC's policy was issued it had a legal
right to convert the local currency into dollars. OPIC then insures the continuance of that right. If the right to convert is
abridged after the policy is issued, for example, by the institution of exchange controls, or is substantially altered to the detriment of the insured, OPIC will transfer dollars to the investor in
exchange for local currency at the prevailing official exchange

53. Id.
54. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art II, Section 2.01 of the OPIC contract provides that
compensation shall be payable
if neither the Investor nor the foreign enterprise is able legally:
(a) to convert earnings from or returns on the insured investment into United
States dollars through any channel during the [specified] days immediately prior
to a claim to OPIC, except at an exchange rate that is less favorable than the
then-prevailing rate described under § 3.01.2, or
(b) to transfer such converted earnings into the United States during such period.
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rate or at the exchange rate available in another legal channel if
there is no official rate. 5
Typically, OPIC requires that the inability to convert continue for a period of time which is specified in the contract, after
applying to the host government's central bank." For countries
in which the ability to convert local currency to foreign exchange
is subject to considerable delay by the central government,
OPIC's insurance, if available at all, will be subject to longer
holding periods. Because of the way the contract is structured,
the insured usually bears the risk of devaluations during the
waiting period.
3.

Business Interruptions

Insurance covering business interruptions caused by war,
revolution, insurrection and civil strife, inconvertibility and expropriation was added to the list of OPIC services under the
1985 OPIC amendments. 7
4.

Special Insurance Programs

OPIC has special insurance programs to cover standby letters of credit and performance bonds. Typically, these letters of
credit and bonds are "on demand" and can be drawn down for
any reason by the beneficiary which in most cases is the host
government. If the drawing is the result of political acts of the
host country, OPIC's insurance coverage indemnifies the U.S.
company for losses resulting from arbitrary or illegal drawing on
the letter of credit or bond issued as a performance or advance
payment guarantee. OPIC's insurance covers ninety percent of
the guarantee and the term of the policy is generally co-extensive with the guarantee. Coverage is available:
1. If the underlying contract provides for a dispute resolution
procedure, or
2. If local law and practice indicate that the procedure and the
underlying contract would be followed in the event of a dispute
involving a drawing under a guarantee and experience indicates

55. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. 3.01(2).
56. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. 2.01.
57. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(D) (1988).
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that the procedure is likely to be fair and impartial.
For bid guarantees, a drawing is deemed to be arbitrary if it
is not justified by the terms of the tender or agreements entered
into with the contractor. For advance payment and performance
guarantees, a drawing is deemed to be arbitrary if: (1) the dispute resolution mechanism in the contract makes an award to
the contractor and the host government does not pay, or (2)
through no fault of the contractor, the tribunal fails to render
any award within a specified time, or (3) the tribunal renders an
award in favor of the host government and the investor can establish that the award was obtained through fraud, corruption
or is not supported by substantial evidence on the record.
E.

Finance Programs

Although political risk insurance traditionally constituted
the bulk of OPIC's operations,5 8 OPIC also has a growing loan
and loan guarantee authority for investment projects in developing countries." Direct financing is usually at market or close-tomarket interest rates. Loan amounts generally range from $1
million to $6 million. To be eligible for OPIC's direct loan program, a U.S. small business must be a project sponsor.
Loan guarantees, covering both commercial and political
risk, are available to projects involving small and large U.S. companies. They are available to larger U.S. companies for projects
located in higher income developing countries only if the
projects have special benefits, such as promotion of a significant
number of U.S. jobs. Loan guarantees usually range from $6 million to $25 million but can reach $50 million for large projects."e
F.

Claims

Many investors believe that the mere existence of OPIC's
insurance can deter political interference by a host government
because of the host government's unwillingness to interfere with
58. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35.
59. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(b), 2194(c) (1988). There is more to say about OPIC's finance
programs, but they are outside the scope of this article.
60. This is a brief description of OPIC's finance programs, which are currently growing in size and importance and shouid be addressed in more detail, but not in this
article.
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a project "sponsored by the United States government."'
In 1991, OPIC settled three civil strife claims and one expropriation claim with cash payments of $2 million and a guaranty settlement of $30 million.2 OPIC has also successfully negotiated
the resolution, without payment by OPIC, of several potential
expropriation claims. In many instances, these negotiations resulted in higher payments to the investor than the amount
claimed. 3
In its twenty year history from 1971 to 1991, OPIC denied
twenty-two claims, "but only seven have been submitted to arbitration by the investors." OPIC has "paid, guaranteed, or provided indemnities for more than $510 million to investors in settlement of 242 insurance claims. As of September 30, 1991,
'
claims pending totaled $5.5 million."64
IV.

MIGA

The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
like OPIC, is intended to encourage the flow of foreign private
investment to developing countries by providing political risk insurance.6 5 MIGA was created to fill the gaps in "national" insurance programs such as OPIC and those of certain other industrialized countries which favor their own nationals and tend to
concentrate on investments in their own regions of the world.6 6
The convention to establish MIGA was opened for signature in
1985 by the Board of Governors of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank); the MIGA
Convention constituting MIGA as an independent member of
the World Bank group was consummated in 1988.67
61. See West, The Utility of Political Risk Insurance as a Transfer Risk Mechanism, in GHADAR, supra note 2, at 118, 123.
62. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 4.
63. As a matter of policy, OPIC does not disclose the amount of insurance coverage.
64. OPIC Press Release, Insurance Claims Experience to Date: OPIC and its Predecessor Agency, Sept. 30, 1991; See also 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35 at 4.
65. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, [hereinafter MIGA Convention] reprintedin XXIV I.L.M. 1598 (1985); see also Shihata, The
Multinational Investment GuaranteeAgency, in PROCEEDINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS
OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 50 (1985-86).
66. L. WALLACE, FIN. & DEV. 48 (1992).
67. MIGA Operational Regulations, I.L.M. Background/Content Summary, 27
I.L.M. 1227 (1988). MIGA Convention, Art. 61.
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Structure and Capitalization

The MIGA Convention entered into force on April 12, 1988
upon ratification by the required minimum of five industrialized
countries (referred to in the MIGA Convention as Category 1
countries) and fifteen developing countries (Category 2 countries) which were required to subscribe to the required minimum
of one third of MIGA's capital (approximately U.S. $360 million). Membership in MIGA is open to all members of the World
Bank.68 To become a member in MIGA each country must ratify
MIGA's Convention, subscribe to a specified amount of capital
and contribute a portion of the capital. 9 A total of 116 countries
have signed the MIGA Convention and 86 have become full
members as of August 7, 1992.
During the first three years after MIGA entered into force,
all decisions of the Board of Directors required a special majority vote consisting of not less than two-thirds of MIGA's total
voting shares representing at least fifty-five percent of its subscribed capital. 0
In effect MIGA required a consensus of developing and industrialized countries. After the first three years, MIGA was to
review its voting structure with a view to reallocating shares,
presumably resulting in a voting split of about 60/40 in favor of
the Category 1 countries. 1 As of July 1992, MIGA had delayed
such review for two more years.72
The business and affairs of MIGA are directed by a Council
of Governors (one representative of each member), a Board of
Directors (elected by the Council), and a Chief Executive Officer
selected by the Board and responsible for the day-to-day business operations. MIGA is an autonomous and self-sufficient in68. MIGA Convention, Art. 61. (Switzerland was separately named as eligible for
MIGA membership and subsequently became a member of the World Bank on May 29,
1992).
69. L.P. Hollywood, MIGA and Long-Term PoliticalRisk Insurancefor Investment
in

Developing Countries, in

THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE: ISSUES AND

No. 63 (17th year), April 1992.
70. MIGA Convention, arts. 3(d), supra note 65, at 39.
71. MIGA Convention, art. 39(c), supra note 65, at 1619; Introductory Note on the

PRACTICE,

MIGA Convention, in 24 I.L.M. 1598, 1603 [hereinafter Introductory Note].

72. Interview with Christophe Bellinger, MIGA, Washington D.C.
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stitution. 73 Its relationship to the World Bank has been described as "symbolic, ' 7' although the President of the World

Bank is Ex Officio Chairman of MIGA's Board of Directors and
nominates MIGA's Chief Executive Officer.Y
1. Capitalization
MIGA was initially to have a share capital of one billion
Special Drawing Rights (SDR).76 Subscriptions have to be based
on relative economic strength as measured by the subscribers'
allocation of shares to the capital of the World Bank. MIGA became operational when one third of its total capital was actually
subscribed. Ten percent of the subscription was to be paid in
cash. Another ten percent was to be paid in nonnegotiable, noninterest bearing promissory notes. The remainder of the subscription was subject to call. Industrialized countries had to pay
in foreign exchange, whereas developing countries could pay up
to twenty-five percent of the cash portion of their subscriptions
77
in their own currency.
B. Programs
MIGA insures against only political, not commercial risks.
At the outset, insurance liabilities could not exceed 150 percent
of the amount of MIGA's subscribed capital plus reserves and a
portion of its reinsurance coverage, or approximately U.S. $1.5
billion. This ratio can now be increased up to a maximum of five
to one. 8
1. Eligibility
Coverage under MIGA is subject to requirements of eligibility for investors and investments similar to those of OPIC. Eligible investors include nationals of a member country, entities incorporated and having their principal place of business in a
member country and entities having a majority of their shares
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

MIGA Convention, art. 25, supra note 65, at 1617.
Shihata, supra note 65, at 53.
MIGA Convention, arts. 32(b), 33(b), supra note 65, at 1618, 1619.
MIGA Convention, art. 5(a), supra note 65, at 1609.
The United States' subscription was $222 million.
MIGA Convention, arts. 7, 8, 22, supra note 65, at 1610, 1615.

25

PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:59

owned by nationals of member countries.79 In an unusual provision, eligible investors also include nationals of the host country
if the assets to be invested are obtained from abroad. This provision is intended to assist developing countries in reversing capital flight."0
Investments must be developmental, comply with the laws
of the host country and be consistent with the host government's development objectives and priorities. 81 Initially, MIGA
insured only equity interests and other forms of direct investment such as shareholder loans and guarantees. By special majority vote of MIGA's Board of Directors, coverage can be extended to other forms of investment including "indirect equitytype investments," (i.e., management, service contracts and licensing agreements).8 2 In addition, loans by a financial institution to an unrelated borrower are insurable if MIGA is also covering a shareholder investment in the project. Certain types of
investments, such as those related to military purposes, cannot
be assisted by MIGA.8"
MIGA can only insure new investments, but eligibility is not
limited to new projects. Like OPIC, it will consider applications
for coverage to be applied to expansion, acquisition and modernization of existing companies."
The host government must approve the investment before
coverage is extended. 5 MIGA can "deem" that an approval has
been obtained if the host government has not objected within a
reasonable period.86 By contrast, OPIC requires specific approval. A matter that will have to be clarified is whether a failure to object can successfully be imposed upon a sovereign state
87
as conclusive of specific approval.
MIGA has the option of seeking an agreement with a host
country concerning treatment of investments that MIGA guar-

79. MIGA Operational Regulations, para. 1.15, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1227 (1988).
80. Introductory Note, supra note 71, 24 I.L.M. at 1600.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

MIGA Convention, art. 12(d), supra note 65, at 1612.
Id. art. 12(b); Hollywood, supra note 69, at 261.
Shihata, supra note 65, at 56.
Hollywood, supra note 69, at 262.
MIGA Convention, art. 15, supra note 65, at 1613.
MIGA Convention, art. 38(b), supra note 65, at 1620.
87. See SMIT, GALSTON AND LEVITSKY, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1981).
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antees. Unlike OPIC, MIGA is required to enter into such an
agreement only if it is not satisfied that the host country can
provide fair and equitable treatment and legal protection for the
investment.88 If entered into, such agreements "will assure that
the Agency... has treatment at least as favorable as that agreed
by the member concerned for the most favorable investment
guarantee agency or state in an agreement related to an
investment." 89
MIGA can only insure new investments but eligibility is not
limited to new projects. Like OPIC, it will consider applications
for coverage to be applied to expansion, acquisition and modernization of existing companies. Additionally, MIGA-assisted investments must be commercially sound.9 0 By contrast, OPIC
usually does not require an assessment of the commercial soundness of an investment.9 MIGA, like OPIC, is expected to be selfsustaining. Rates can vary on the basis of the characteristics of
the project, but not the characteristics of the host country.92
The agency has experienced record results on its investment
programs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992. By June 30
MIGA had issued 21 investment insurance contracts with a combined maximum coverage of U.S. $313 million and with a total
of U.S. $504 million written as of that date. In fiscal year 1991,
MIGA had written a total of 11 contracts with maximum coverage of U.S. $59 million. 3
2. Coverage
The MIGA Convention provides coverage against four broad
categories of risk:
1. Transfer risk resulting from restrictions on currency conversion and transfer;
2. Risk of loss resulting from legislative or administrative ac-

88. MIGA Convention, art. 23(b), supra note 65, at 1616.
89. OPIC is likely to have the most favored treatment by virtue of its own bilateral
agreements.
90. MIGA Convention, art. 12(d)(i), supra note 65, at 1612.
91. This is not always the case, however, because the political risk attached to a
venture can increase if a venture is not commercially sound.
92. Shihata, supra note 65, at 60.
93. MIGA Press Release, MIGA GuaranteesReach U.S. $500 Million Mark, July 9,
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tions or omissions that have the effect of depriving the investor
of ownership or control or substantial benefits from the investment (expropriation);
3. Repudiation or breach of government contracts where the investor has no access to a competent judicial or arbitral forum, or
faces Unreasonable delays or is unable to enforce a judicial or
arbitral decision issued in its favor; and
4. The risk of war and civil disturbance.
A special majority of MIGA's Board of Directors can vote to
cover additional political risks on an ad hoc basis if the investor
and the host country so request."
In the beginning, MIGA envisioned some control and financial participation by developing countries as well as by industrialized countries.95 This has made MIGA more acceptable to developing countries. However, it could also have created some
potential concern about MIGA's coverage particularly in connection with events of expropriation or contract repudiation where
the investor and the host government might disagree as to
whether a taking or repudiation could occur or as to its cause.
The MIGA Convention addressed this concern by excluding
from coverage "non-discriminatory measures of general application which governments normally take for the purpose of regulating economic activity in their territories." 96 This provision has
been explained as follows:
This exclusion is not meant to confine coverage under that provision to outright expropriation. The exclusion applies only to host
governmental measures that meet all its requirements, i.e., to
measures that (a) do not discriminate against the investor, (b) are
normally taken by governments, and (c) are taken for the purpose
of regulating economic activities in the host country's territory.
The Commentary on the Convention, which was also approved by
the Bank's Executive Directors, lists as examples of such measures "taxation, environmental and labor legislation as well as
normal measures for the maintenance of public safety."97

94. MIGA Convention, art. 11(b), supra note 65, at 1612.
95. Shihata, supra note 65, at 53. This is unlike an earlier attempt by the World
Bank to promote a political risk insurance agency.
96. MIGA Convention, art. 11(a)(ii), supra note 65, at 1611.
97. Shihata, supra note 65, at 55 (emphasis in text).
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The same commentator also acknowledged that "[t]he value
of the expropriation coverage will depend largely on MIGA's
ability to cope with the problem of 'creeping expropriation' and
expropriation in the guise of apparently legal measures adopted
'
by the host government."98
Interpretation and application of the MIGA Convention are
decided by MIGA's Board of Directors subject to appeal to
MIGA's Council of Governors. 9 Some rules and regulations for
MIGA's operations were originally set at a "Preparatory Conference" in October 1986; neither the allocation of voting rights nor
the definitions of expropriation and compensation were addressed at the conference. Operational regulations were adopted
on June 22, 1988100 and eligible risks were defined in the General
Conditions of Guarantee made part of the Standard Contract of
Guarantee adopted January 25, 1989.101

3.

Claims

Disputes arising under insurance contracts between MIGA
and its insureds can, but are not required to, be submitted for
arbitration.10 When MIGA pays or agrees to pay a claim, it is to
be subrogated to the rights of the investor. Disputes between
MIGA and the host country arising out of subrogation are normally settled by negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. 10 3
MIGA is permitted to sell or use local currency obtained in an
inconvertibility settlement if its agreement with the host country so provides. This is similar to the arrangement that OPIC
10
has with the United States Department of State. '
4. Comparisons With National Programs
Compared to national programs such as OPIC, MIGA has
raised some concerns that will have to be addressed before it
becomes completely acceptable to foreign investors.
98. Id. at 54.
99. MIGA Convention, arts.
100. 27 I.L.M. 1227 (1988).
101. 28 I.L.M. 1233 (1989).
102. MIGA Convention, art.
103. MIGA Convention, art.
104. MIGA Convention, art.

56, 30, 31, supra note 65, at 1625, 1617.

57, supra note 65, at 1626.
57, Annex II, supra note 65, at.1626, 1631.
18(c), supra note 65, at 1614.
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First, MIGA's portfolio of business in its first few years is
likely to be relatively small and, by the process of adverse selection, risky. Even if MIGA reinsures, it is likely to have a relatively small number of investments over which to spread its risk.
This means that the potential risk of a substantial loss will be
high, at least in the early years. This can be expected to result in
high premiums if MIGA is to be self-sustaining. Under these circumstances, an investor might also have some concern about
MIGA's ability to pay substantial claims during the start-up period except by a call upon its members.10 5
Second, it is not clear how MIGA will resolve internally the
potentially troublesome and divisive issues of what constitutes
an expropriatory act and what is fair compensation. 0 6
On the other hand, MIGA could supplement OPIC and
other national insurance plans, by the following means. First,
MIGA is empowered to cover the risks of war damage to landbased assets. Such coverage is not generally available in the private market. OPIC offers such coverage, but MIGA's entry into
the field might provide some additional volume of coverage and
might also encourage changes in the private market. Second,
MIGA, by virtue of its "symbolic" relationship with the World
Bank, might discourage a host government from interfering with
covered investments. Moreover, MIGA, like OPIC, can assist investors in obtaining recoveries, conceivably even in excess of
coverage. Finally, MIGA might be more politically acceptable to
a host government as a subrogee of the insured's rights. This
10 7
might facilitate work-out arrangements.

105. MIGA is not underwritten by the World Bank. Shihata, supra note 65, at 52.
106. Payments of claims are decided by the President of MIGA "under the direction
of the Board [of Directors] ... [and] in accordance with the contract of guarantee and
such policies as the Board may adopt." MIGA Convention, art. 17, supra note 65. The
terms and conditions of MIGA's insurance contracts are also subject to the 'rules and
regulation' of the Board of Directors. Id. at art. 16. Except for the first three years, the
Board decided by majority vote. Id. at arts. 39, 42(a). Decisions about contract language
and claims can, therefore, ultimately be made or changed by the Board of Directors,
which will have on it substantial representation from developing countries.
107. Developing countries sometimes resent subrogation to a government. See Allison, supra note 43. Cf. Theodor Meron, The World Bank and Insurance,47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L.J. 301, 312 (1974-75); Edward M. Martin, Multilateral Investment Insurance:
the OECD Proposal, 8 HARV. INT'L L.J. 280, 318-319 (1967).
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V.

EXIMBANK

It is the policy of most industrialized countries to encourage
their domestic companies to export and, to some extent, to invest in foreign countries.'0 8 This policy is intended to serve a
number of national interests, such as increasing or protecting
domestic employment, assuring supplies of raw materials or
other important products, gaining access to restricted markets,
and advancing foreign policy objectives.
Most industrialized countries support exports and foreign
investment through various programs. 09 These programs can
also reduce the costs of goods and services for exporters and investors. The United States supports exports principally by the
Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank)." '
A.

Structure And General Coverage

Eximbank is a government corporation. It is managed by a
five member Board of Directors who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, of which not more than three
can be from one political party."'
Eximbank's borrowings and financings are general obligations of the United States and are therefore backed by its full
faith and credit.' 1 2 In addition, although Eximbank receives no
appropriated funds, Congress does establish ceilings on what it
can loan, guarantee, or insure each fiscal year.

108. H.L.

WEISBERG AND CHARLES RAUCH,

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXPORT INDUS-

TRIES IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY AND JAPAN

[hereinafter

(1979)

WEISBERG].

109. Id. at 26-30.

ROBINSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD:

HENSIVE STUDY OF SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRY

A

COMPRE-

INVESTMENT PROMOTION PROGRAMS

ROBINSON]. See also, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS ON EXPORT CREDIT COMPETITION FOR THE PE-

(1980) [hereinafter
RIOD JANUARY

1, 1984,

THROUGH DECEMBER

IMBANK REPORT]; CONGRESSIONAL

IMPORT BANK LOAN SUBSIDIARY PROGRAM

110. 12 U.S.C.
111. 12 U.S.C.

§
§

31, 1984 (September 1985) [hereinafter Ex-

BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETS AND COSTS OF THE EXPORT-

(March 1981) [hereinafter CBO

REPORT].

635a(a) (1988).
635a(b), (c)(2) (1988).

112. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 27 (1966).
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ECIP

The Eximbank Export Credit Insurance Program (ECIP),
unlike OPIC and MIGA, provides commercial as well as political
risk coverage to exporters and foreign investors. Political risks
covered through ECIP include war, revolution, insurrection, expropriation and inconvertibility of local currency. Commercial
risks covered include the buyer's insolvency or protracted
default.
ECIP has been restructured twice during the last two years.
Prior to 1991, the Foreign Credit Insurance Association
("FCIA"), an association of approximately 50 leading private insurance companies, sold and serviced Eximbank export credit
insurance policies. In October 1992, responsibility for administration of this program was transferred to FCIA Management
Company, a private contractor. Effective September 1992, the
program has become an in-house controlled operation, but will
continue to offer the same services provided by the private
contractor. 13
Credit insurance is Eximbank's major program for shortterm transactions, which are fewer than 180 days in duration."
This program insures against low foreign sales receivables. ECIP
can insure U.S. exporters against ninety percent of commercial
risk and 100 percent of the political risk associated with the financed portion of export sales.11 5 Any entity engaged in exporting or the export financing *of U.S. goods is eligible for coverage. 6 A bank can purchase a policy directly or the proceeds of a
policy can be assigned to a bank in order to make it possible to
obtain private export credits at lower interest rates.
ECIP's predecessor FCIA insured about three percent of
U.S. exports. Over half of this coverage was provided to
113. See Eximbank Press Guidance; Export Credit Insurance Program, August 13,
1992. Eximbank officials have stated that this return to in-house adminstration is in the
best interest of the program, citing a built-in conflict of interest involving the program's
government guarantee as one reason behind the decision.
114. EXIMBANK REPORT, supra note 109, at 35.
115. ECIP Combined Short-Term/Medium-Term/Comprehensive Policy [hereinafter ECIP Policy].
116. ECIP will continue to provide the same insurance services as provided by FCIA
Management Company.
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banks."1 7 Eximbank's in-house program will continue to provide
uninterrupted coverage to participating investors and provide
the vehicle for a more efficient and effective marketing effort.
1. Requirements
ECIP covers short and medium-term transactions. Shortterm coverage is available if fifty percent of the value of a transaction is of United States origin; medium-term coverage usually
requires 100 percent United States origin.
Certain conditions must be met on all exports covered by
medium-term insurance. Initially, the foreign buyer must make
a cash payment of at least fifteen percent of the contract price
on or before delivery. The U.S. exporter must then retain at
least ten percent of the risk of the financed portion of each
transaction (that is, the contract price less any cash payments).
Furthermore, repayment terms cannot exceed those customary
in international trade for the goods covered, although the term
will vary with the contract value. Higher contract values are eligible for longer terms of up to five years.
Premiums will vary with the repayment terms and with associated commercial and political risks. ECIP claims must generally be filed within 120 days after the date of default. Amounts
received after payment of a claim, and after payment of ECIP's
collection expenses, are shared between the insured and ECIP in
the ratio in which they apportioned the loss.
2.

Multi-Buyer Programs"8

ECIP's multi-buyer programs assist U.S. exporters doing
business with many buyers on a continuous basis. The programs
allow a degree of flexibility to the exporter. ECIP offers shortterm (up to 180 days) and medium-term (up to five years) multibuyer policies. These policies cover both commercial and political risks. ECIP also offers policies that cover only political risks.
The multi-buyer policies usually include discretionary credit
limits (commonly up to $200,000), which allow the exporter to

117. CBO

REPORT, supra note 109, at 11.
118. The First National Bank of Chicago, National Export Credit Program (1985)
(internal material).
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obtain coverage automatically on certain individual transactions
without referring the transactions for separate approval by
Eximbank.
ECIP relies to a great extent on the insured to check the
creditworthiness of foreign buyers covered by multi-buyer policies. In order to encourage the insured to exercise sound credit
judgment within the discretionary limits, ECIP's coverage for
commercial risk requires that ten percent of the risk be retained
by the insured.11 9 Sales above the discretionary credit limit require ECIP's approval. Such policies normally have an annual
commercial first loss deductible, similar to that in automobile
insurance, which does not, however, apply to losses resulting
from political, as contrasted to commercial, events. Multi-buyer
policies can cover up to ninety percent of the commercial risk
and up to 100 percent of the political risk.
These policies are generally written for a one-year period
and cover sales to end-users, dealers or distributors. 12 0 The actual percentage of coverage for a specific transaction can be
lower, depending upon Eximbank's assessment of commercial
and political risks.
3.

Single-Buyer Programs

ECIP offers three programs to insure exports to a single
buyer (generally on medium-term repayment periods) of capital
goods or goods having relatively high unit values. These three
programs are called the medium-term single sale policy, the medium-term repetitive policy, and the combined short-term/medium-term policy. The buyer must make a minimum down payment of fifteen percent on all three policies.
Under the medium-term single sale policy, coverage applies
to a single specified sale. The insured can make separate shipments during a specific period. This period is usually six
months, although the period can be extended. Typically, each
separate shipment must be covered by a separate promissory
note issued by the buyer, but ECIP will also cover multiple ship119. Id. Financing banks are often expected to share with the exporter up to one
half of the uninsured risk for supplier credits.
120. Id. In the political risk-only policies, ECIP is prepared to cover up to 200 percent of political risk.
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ments on a single promissory note.
The medium-term repetitive policy offers the same coverage
as the medium-term single sale policy but applies to goods
shipped to a single buyer (usually a dealer or distributor) over a
specific renewable period (usually one year).
The combined short-term/medium-term policy covers capi-tal goods on terms similar to those of other policies, as well as
parts and accessories for up to 180 days. It can also finance inventories related to exports of capital goods for up to 270 days.
At the end of the period, the policyholder can convert the shortterm obligation into medium-term insurance coverage upon
making a fifteen percent down payment on the cost of the
policy.
C. Letters of Credit
Eximbank has also established insurance coverage for letters of credit issued by banks. Under the policy, which is not
applicable to back-to-back, red clause, conditional or standby
letters of credit: 1. The financing bank can pass more risk exposure along to the exporter; 2. Coverage is the same for both political and commercial risk;' 3. The waiting period for filing
claims following default is shortened from 180 days to sixty
days; and 4. ECIP is prepared to commit to coverage for ninety
days.
The insured can apply for a credit limit for an issuing bank
so that, within that limit, insurance can be issued for a specific
class of transactions. These transactions include, for example,
those from a particular exporter to a particular importer, or of a
particular product to a particular importer. Transactions can be
in U.S. dollars, pounds sterling, French francs, Deutsche marks,
Swiss francs, or yen.
At least fifty percent of the value of the goods before
markup must be of United States origin. The policy normally
covers payment terms of up to 180 days after presentation. It
can also cover letters of credit used to finance the sale of services
performed by U.S. personnel. For coverage to be effective, the

121. Id. Ninety-five percent for most transactions, ninety-eight percent for sales of
bulk agricultural commodities, and one hundred percent for sovereign obligations.
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issuing bank must accept the documents as those provided for in
the letters of credit.
1. Special Programs
ECIP offers certain specialized programs, including insurance against specific risks during preshipment,1 1 insurance
against political risk for consignment sales,1" 3 and insurance for
sales of bulk agricultural commodities sold on the basis of irrevocable letters of credit.
D. Private Export Funding Corporation
The Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO) is a private company owned by several U.S. commercial banks and corporations. 24 It extends medium-term and long-term loans to
foreign buyers of U.S. capital goods. All PEFCO loans must be
covered by an unconditional guarantee by Eximbank of both
principal and interest. PEFCO raises its loan funds in the private capital market, using Eximbank's guarantee. Similarly, Eximbank's approval is required for individual loan commitments
by PEFCO.
PEFCO was organized as a supplementary lending source. It
generally does not make loans of less than $1 million. It makes
loans only when necessary funds are not available from the usual
private sector sources on normal credit terms at competitive interest rates. PEFCO's principal value to the export community
has been its ability to make loans when loans from more traditional lenders are less readily available, and to make them at
fixed interest rates for longer than normal commitment periods.
VII.

OTHER GOVERNMENT SPONSORED AND PRIVATE INSURANCE

Virtually every industrialized country, and a number of developing countries, including India, have investment insurance
' It is difficult to describe
programs similar to those of OPIC. 25
122. Id. This is the period of fabrication of goods for which sales contracts have
been executed, generally for products that cannot easily be sold to another buyer.
123. Id. This is where the exporter retains title until the goods are sold.
124. See, Warren W. Glick and Robert J. McKinsey, The Export-Import Bank of
the United States, in 2 INT'L FIN. L. (Rendell, ed., 2d ed., Euromoney Publications 1983).
125. Weisberg, supra note 108; Robinson, supra note 109.
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what is available in the private political risk insurance market,
because the information is frequently confidential and the market is often in flux.
A.

Other Government Sponsored Insurance

Some of these government-sponsored insurance programs
are operated by the same agencies that handle export insurance
and credits, a function which Eximbank performs for U.S. exporters. Some of the agencies are administered by private companies, but all of the programs issue political risk insurance with
governmental authority and financial backing.12 6 These agencies
are members of the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers (the Berne Union).
Most official investment insurance programs base eligibility
on the company's domicile and its operations in the host country, rather than, as in OPIC programs, on the nationality of the
company's ownership. In principle, therefore, an investment by a
subsidiary of a U.S. company could be covered under several
programs, so long as the investment has real commercial value
to the insuring country. 12 7 Financing and insurance for exports,
unlike for investments, are generally available from nonofficial
programs without reference to the nationality of the exporter, so
long as the source requirements are met. The crucial test is
whether the exporting country receives benefit.12 8
Political risk insurance programs offered by other industrialized countries are frequently available in more countries and
areas than are OPIC's programs. However, in practice, many
such programs concentrate on developing countries, particularly
former colonies. 2 9 Government-to-government agreements,
which are similar to OPIC's bilateral agreements, are rarely required by other programs.
Most other industrialized countries limit their programs to
new investments. Other programs are not necessarily restricted

126. Cecil Hunt, Government and Private Political Risk Insurance in DOING BusiNESS IN HIGH RISK COUNTRIES 6, 8 (1979).

127. Id. at 9-10.
128. See 12 U.S.C. § 635a (1988).
129. See Weisberg, supra note 108, at 8-9; Hunt, supra note 126, at 11.

37

PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:59

to private sector projects.'"
Most political risk insurance programs for investment offered by other industrialized countries require that insured investments fulfill some policy objectives. These objectives range
from developmental benefits to the host country to exports from
the insuring country.
B.

Private Political Risk Insurance

In general, relatively few private insurers directly cover political risk.1 3 ' In covering property and casualty risks, some private insurers will, in effect, also cover losses resulting indirectly
from political acts. Coverage for fire damage, for example, will
usually extend to damage caused by acts that are "politically"
motivated. Private political risk insurance is generally not available for more than three years, although it may be renewed for
additional periods.
1. Companies Active In This Field
The largest U.S. private political risk insurer is probably the
American International Group (AIG). The Political Risk Division of AIG was merged in 1984 with five other "agency companies" to create AIG Specialty Agencies, Inc., a wholly-owned
132
subsidiary of AIG.
Lloyds of London, Panfinancial, the Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, and the Continental Corporation, through its
affiliates, Swett & Crawford and Pacific Insurance Company, are
also major political risk insurers. Lloyds works through special
underwriters who accept risks on behalf of individual members

130. Hunt, supra note 126, at 11.
131. See generally CHARLES M. NEWMAN II AND JAMES CZECHOWICZ, INTERNATIONAL
RISK MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCESS AND PRACTICES

(Financial Executives Research Foun-

dation 1983), at 139-75; Rober Svensk, The Role of Private Sector Insurance in
FARIBORZ GHADAR ET AL, MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK: STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES (Ghadar and Assoc. 1983), at 114.
132. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, 28-9 (1985). Other

agencies merged with the Political Risk Division include divisions insuring oil and gas
drillings rigs, the transportation industry nonstandard personal automobile risk, kidnapransom and extortion, and special coverage for the entertainment industry. 2 MOODY'S
BANK AND FINANCIAL MANUAL 2924 (1984); 2 MOODY'S BANK AND FINANCIAL MANUAL 2926

(1985).
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grouped in one or more of the 350 syndicates now in operation.
Access to Lloyd's underwriters is controlled exclusively by
Lloyd's brokers.
Most political risk insurance on investments, especially
large investments, is negotiated by a few specialized brokers, not
directly with the insured.1 3 3 The brokers are legally the agents of
the insured and are valuable for their expertise in keeping
abreast of a changing market.
2.

Coverage Available

Private insurance covering a substantial number of foreign
political and commercial risks is generally available. Under expropriation (often referred to as "confiscation, expropriation and
nationalization"), private insurers can cover both new and existing investments. 3 " Private insurance coverage is also sometimes available against risks of inconvertibility and generally
against the risks of arbitrary drawdowns of on-demand bank
guarantees or bonds. Private political risk coverage is generally
not available against risks of war damage to land-based assets,
35
for reasons discussed below.'
Private insurance is also available against the commercial
risks of contract repudiation by public buyers (not usually by
private buyers), export embargoes, import embargoes and defaults of buyers for commercial reasons.1 36 Coverage against
losses caused by defaults for political reasons is available from
private insurers under their standard political risk contracts.
Premiums will vary considerably depending upon the investment, but tend to be higher than premiums charged by
OPIC and ECIP. Private insurers will often quote premiums as a
single amount for the duration of the coverage, although they
37
might be payable in periodic installments.'

133. See Survey on Insurance and InsuranceBrokering, FINANCIAL TIMES, April 16,
1986; Frank, supra note 5; Hunt, supra note 126.
134. OPIC cannot insure existing investments.
135. OPIC does cover such risks. •
136. ECIP offers all such coverage.
137. By contrast, the premiums of OPIC and ECIP are quoted on an annual basis.
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Reinsurance

The political risk insurance market is relatively small, but
demand is increasing. In order for political risk insurance to be
commercially viable over time, the portfolio of investments insured must be large and diverse. Otherwise, the insurer runs the
risk of wiping out one or two years' premiums with one major
loss. Most private political risk insurers, therefore, seek to coinsure or reinsure some of their risk portfolios.
Reinsurance is a key to the development of the private political risk industry. 13 8 With some important exceptions, the primary reinsurance market for political risk insurance lies in a few
syndicates associated with Lloyds. The reinsurance market at
Lloyds is complex. Often there may be more than 100 underwriters on a single large reinsurance project.
The reinsurance market is now a limitation on the development of the private political risk insurance industry. Much of
political risk reinsurance evolved out of property and casualty
coverage, as reinsurers moved gradually from covering acts of
God to covering acts of governments. The movement, however,
has been gradual. For example, to date, there is only one private
reinsurance treaty (Panfinance) that appears to cover landbased assets against war risks. 139 The overlap between the political risk reinsurance market and the property and casualty reinsurance market is such that when the property and casualty
market is required to pay a large number of claims, the availability of political risk reinsurance is often further constrained.
Reinsurance can be by treaty or by project-"facultative"
reinsurance. 14° Facultative reinsurance is done by a single reinsurer, whereas treaty insurance is done by a group of reinsurers.
Facultative reinsurance includes, almost by definition, a limited
portfolio of investments, whereas treaty reinsurance covers all
investments that fit the requirements of the treaty. As such, facultative reinsurance is generally more expensive and less reliable
138. See Survey on Reinsurance, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1986; Hunt, supra note 126.
139. By contrast, vessels can be covered for war risks. The theory is that the insurers could, by contract, require an insured vessel to leave a war zone within a reasonable
period. They obviously cannot do so with fixed landbased assets.
140. See e.g., the OPIC Amendments Act of 1985, Sec. 10, and the discussion in S.
Rep. 99-156, supra note 22, at 5-6.
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99

than treaty reinsurance, which provides the greatest potential
for growth in the political reinsurance industry.

VIII.

NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING POINTS

At least three documents are crucial to insurance coverage:
the underlying investment contract, to which the insurer is not a
signatory; the application for insurance; and the insurance contract itself. In negotiating and drafting these documents, investors or lenders seeking insurance against the political and commercial risks of foreign transactions should consider a number of
points, including provisions that have been important in disputes between insurers and insureds.
A.

The Underlying Contract

The parties to the underlying investment contract should
consider the need for commercial and/or political risk insurance.
B. When Should Commercial Risk Insurance Coverage be
Considered?
Insurance coverage for the elements of commercial risk
should be addressed in the planning stage of an investment.
This is not a requirement of law, but of practicality. In principle,
insurers are prepared to issue coverage at any time. The most
fundamental axiom of the insurance business, however, is to insure before a loss is sustained.
In some contracts, particularly with or within developing
countries, foreign investors specify that insurance of a certain
description will be procured. This is partly because local investors or governments might later object to the cost of insurance
or want to reduce the coverage below a level at which the foreign
investor or its lenders are comfortable.
In addition, some countries require that insurance be purchased from local insurers. In China, for example, the joint venture law provides that "[t]he insurance appropriate to a joint
venture shall be furnished by Chinese insurance companies. '
Technically, only foreign investments structured as equity joint
141. China Joint Venture, supra note 15, at Art. 8.
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ventures are subject to this requirement. The government can
waive the requirement, and it appears that, in practice, the requirement has been waived if the joint venture agreement permits the purchase of foreign insurance.1 42 Many contracts with
or within developing countries include provisions that require
procurement of local goods and services.14 This requirement
could extend to the procurement of insurance.
Any explicit or likely requirement to buy local insurance
should surface in negotiations at the planning stage. Requirements for local procurement can often be waived in the contract
by the local participant and can usually be specifically waived by
the government. The investor's maximum leverage to obtain
such a waiver is in the planning stage, when the investment is
being negotiated.
1.

Should the Contract Provide for Political Risk Insurance?

Whether the underlying contract should provide for the
procurement of political risk insurance is a more difficult issue.
As noted earlier, OPIC can insure investments only if its coverage is "additional""1 " to the investment. In most cases additionality can be established if the investor registers its intention to
procure insurance. Additionality can also be demonstrated by a
provision in the underlying contract stating that the investment
cannot proceed without the procurement of political risk insurance from OPIC, or, as an alternative, political risk insurance
acceptable to the investor.
Although private insurers impose no such registration requirements, " 5 it is often prudent, as noted, to bind private insurance in the planning stage, and in the underlying contract.
Many investors are concerned, however, that an explicit provision for political risk insurance might be offensive to a host government and might make negotiations more difficult. This concern is sometimes valid, although the experience of many

142. See S. Linn Williams, ProtectingInvestments in China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, 431 (PLI 1985).

143. Sometimes this requirement is lifted to local goods and services that are competitive in quality and price.
144. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
145. Insurance can be purchased whether or not it is additional to the investment.
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negotiators has been that most developing countries are relatively sophisticated about the investor's need for such insurance.
It is often sufficient to explain that commercial lenders typically
require such insurance, at least on any funds they lend, and
often on the investor's equity as well.
In addition, a requirement under the older forms of OPIC's
bilateral agreements, was a specific approval" 6 of an investment
before it would issue insurance. The government of the developing country, therefore, might have specific notice of OPIC's coverage, but it would not know the amount of such coverage. In
contrast, many private insurers do not want developing countries to know of the existence of the insurance, for the same reasons that defense lawyers do not want a jury apprised of the
existence of insurance in liability cases. Indeed, many private insurers would consider it a violation of the insurance contract if
the insured advised the host government of the existence of coverage. The most prudent approach is to check with the private
insurer during the planning stage and obtain the insurer's instructions on whether or not to provide for political risk insurance in the underlying agreement.
C.

Important Provisions

As noted earlier in the discussion of OPIC, the provisions of
the underlying contract can become crucial to the scope of the
insurance coverage. Political risk insurance does not cover losses
resulting from acts that the investor agreed to in its contract.
There are a number of provisions in underlying investment contracts that have been important in disputes over the scope of
insurance coverage and therefore merit special consideration.
The following are some examples.
1. Force Majeure
The force majeure clause, at a minimum, should be drafted
in such a way that it does not excuse a claim that an expropriatory act has occurred.14 7

146. This is called a Foreign Government Approval.
147. See supra note 18 for definition.

43

PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 5:59

Dispute Resolution

OPIC's insurance relating to the dispute resolution provision in certain instances underscores the importance of negotiating this provision. For example, if the investor agrees that disputes are to be resolved by local courts, the investor will be
bound by the results of that process. An investor cannot agree to
such a dispute resolution procedure and then argue later that
the procedure itself is inherently unfair or partial.
3.

Choice of Law

The choice of law provision can affect the substantive law
applied to an issue of coverage such as whether an expropriatory
act occurred. Applicable law in most insurance contracts is the
law of New York, England or a similar jurisdiction. Most of
these jurisdictions will not have direct authority on the law of
expropriations and would therefore apply international law in
the absence of a specific choice of law provision in the contract
relating to the determination of expropriation. If the underlying
contract applies local law to issues arising out of that contract, a
tribunal would probably respect that choice of law and evaluate
the issue of whether an expropriatory act had occurred by reference, first, to local law. 148 Local law must also meet standards
imposed by international law.149 However, if the taking has been
accomplished in a manner in accordance with local law, and if
the local law meets the threshold requirements of international
law, no expropriatory act might have occurred under the usual
definition of "expropriatory act" in an insurance contract.1 5
4. Minimizing Loss, Maximizing Recoveries
Insurance contracts typically require that the insured take
all necessary steps to minimize loss and maximize recoveries.
148. See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978) [hereinafter TOPCO]; CHITTARANGAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967).
149. TOPCO, supra note 148; Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, Am. Arb. Assoc. Case No. 16 10 0137 76 (1978) (Bergan, Arb.);
Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 35 INT'L L.
RPTS. 136 (1967).
150. See Sohn and Baxter, supra note 11.
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This clause can be construed to require invocation of judicial
and other remedies, which can be constrained by the dispute
resolution and choice of law clauses.
5. Start-up
In the drafting of many contracts, serious consideration
should be given to the definition of "start-up." From the standpoint of the investor or lender, the start-up should be accomplished as quickly and automatically as possible. The start-up
stage can, however, last from months to years. The start-up generally implies operation at economically viable levels over a reasonable period of time. For example, the start-up of a chemical
investment could be defined as the output of a certain volume
and quality of gas, as verified by an impartial third party. This
is particularly significant for so-called turnkey contracts, in
which the investor agrees to provide a fully operational facility.
The risk of operating the facility shifts to the new owners only
at the startup of operations. A government's questionable acts
toward the investment, therefore, might be deemed to be "commercial," rather than "political," and therefore not covered by
most insurance contracts, if the start-up has not yet occurred.
D. Applications
The document that an insured executes at the planning
stage is usually an application for insurance, not an insurance
contract. Often, these applications are entered into under great
time pressures, and the insured or its broker must mobilize a
number of coinsurers in order to obtain the necessary level and
type of coverage.
1. Obligations of the Prospective Insured
Misstatements or omissions in applications have been the
subject of a number of disputes between insureds and insurers.
In view of the substantial losses that insurers could incur as a
result of risk analysis based upon incorrect facts, the law of most
jurisdictions imposes an obligation upon prospective insureds to
disclose accurately and completely information that is material
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to the issuance of an insurance contract.15 ' If they do not do so,
the contract can be declared void ab initio.
Under New York law, for example, which is commonly applied in insurance contracts, there are two grounds for cancellation of insurance contracts by insurers: misrepresentation of material facts and concealment of material facts. Under most
circumstances, New York law imposes upon a prospective insured a duty to disclose to the insurer all facts that are material
to the issuance of an insurance policy. 5 ' New York law generally
does not impose upon insurers a duty to investigate the accuracy
of an insured's representations. 153 Only if an insurer has deliberately disregarded notice of an insured's misrepresentations will
it be deemed to have waived its right to cancel an insurance contract because of misrepresentation or concealment of material
facts.'54
Materiality is often defined by statute 5 but, under most
common law definitions, a material fact is one that induces action that the insurer might otherwise not have taken if it had
known the true facts.

56

Modern analysis focuses upon the free-

dom of choice of the insurer. In order to weigh properly the risks
and benefits associated with the transaction and thereby to
make a correct choice, full and accurate disclosure of all information related to the risks is required. A potential insured who
misrepresents or conceals facts skews the insurer's analysis and
deprives the insurer of its freedom of choice on whether to insure the transaction and on what premium to charge. 57
In order to prove that it might not have entered into a
transaction had it been aware of all the facts, an insurer can
show that its practice is not to enter into such contracts when
such risks are involved. Affidavits and testimony of insurance of151. See, e.g., note 152, infra.
152. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3105 (McKinney's 1985).
153. See Geer v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 125 (1937); American General
Life Ins. Co. v. Dos Santos, 457 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1st Dep't 1983); Kantor v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 227 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dep't 1962).
154. See Orent v. Equitable Life Ins. Society, 51 N.Y.S.2d 115 (2d Dep't 1944).
155. See supra note 152.
156. See L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co., 421 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d
Dep't 1979).
157. See also Leamy v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 271, 383 N.Y.S.2d 564,
347 N.E.2d 889 (1976).
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' which can
ficers have been sufficient to prove such a practice, 58
also be demonstrated by reference to underlying rules and
manuals. 159 Because each insurer is free to accept or reject
whatever risks it chooses, the reasonableness of an insurer's underwriting policies ordinarily cannot be challenged.' 60
Misrepresented facts can be material even though they are
not the only facts involved in the insurer's decision to enter into
a contract,'"' and even though they are not the cause of a loss.' 62
It is not necessary for the insurer to prove fraudulent intent by
the insured in order to maintain an action for misrepresentation.
Even "innocent" misrepresentation, if material, is a sufficient
ground for cancellation.'6 3
An action for concealment in contract requires proof of
fraudulent intent. It is fraudulent for an insured to fail to disclose facts that it knows would be material to the insurer in acting upon the application." The standard of materiality is generally the same as in misrepresentation. 6 5
The application can influence whether an omission of a material fact constitutes a "concealment" or a "misrepresentation."
Under New York law, for example, this would depend upon
whether an insurer made an inquiry relating to the undisclosed
fact. The application form constitutes such an inquiry. If no inquiry is made, omission of a material fact constitutes concealment only if the insured knows that such a fact is material. For
example, once an inquiry is made, in the application, omission or
misrepresentation of a material fact constitutes a misrepresentation, regardless of the insured's knowledge that such fact is
material. 6 '

158. See Meyers v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 401 N.Y.S.2d 325 (3d Dep't
1978); But see Witter v. IDS Insurance Co., 466 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1983) (unsupported assertions are not sufficient).
159. See Friedman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 589 F.Supp. 1017
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
160. See Fernandez v. Windsor Life Ins. Co. of America, 83 Misc.2d 301, 372,
N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1975).
161. See Geer v. Union Mutual Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 261, 7 N.E.2d 125 (1973).
162. See Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 382 (1931).
163. See Anderson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 193 N.E. 181 (1934).
164. See Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 382 (1931).
165. See, e.g., L. Smirlock v. Title Guarantee Co., 421 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1979).
166. See VanderVeer v. Continental Casualty Co., 34 N.Y.2d 50, 356 N.Y.S.2d 13
(1974).
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Provisions In Applications

An investor should give very careful attention to an application for insurance and perhaps even seek outside advice from a
broker or experienced lawyer. The application usually requests
basic information about the investment. It also requests information about the management of the investment, the relationship of the investment and the investor to the host government,
and the dependence of the investment on the investor.1 1 7 The
following are some of the typical provisions in applications that
have been the subject of disputes between insureds and insurers.
a.

Accounting method

Most applications require a statement of the accounting
method used by the insured with respect to the investment. It is
crucial to the insurer that it be able to obtain adequate salvage
of any investment on which it pays a claim and to which it is
thereby subrogated. This requires that the same accounting
method be used to determine the payment of claims and the valuation of the investment in the host country. However, sometimes the methods investors employ to account for the investment in the host country differ from those used to account for
the investment in the home country. In fact, generally accepted
accounting principles might even require such differing
treatment.
It is prudent for the applicant to disclose any such differences in the application. In the event of a dispute, particularly
one involving possible expropriation, the insurer's salvage will be
substantially affected by the valuation applied to the investment
in the host country. If the insured expects the insurer to pay a
claim based upon the value of that investment in the United
States, the insurer has a right to expect that the value of the
investment in the United States will not differ substantially
from the value of the investment in the host country. Otherwise,
the insurer's salvage rights will be adversely affected without its
knowledge or approval.

167. For example, this could occur because of licensed technology.
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b. Items insured
Most applications require a comprehensive description and
listing of the items to be insured. In general, property and casualty insurers cover only tangible, physical assets, and they can
reasonably expect an insured to state the nature of its assets accurately in its application. Political risk insurers sometimes insure nontangible assets such as receivables. They rarely extend
coverage, however, substantially beyond the stated value of
fixed, tangible assets.
c.

"Catch-all" question

Most applications contain a "catch-all" question that requests information on any matters that might affect coverage or
give rise to a claim. An insured is not required to speculate in
answering such an inquiry. On the other hand, if the insured has
actual knowledge of a dispute or potential dispute that might
affect its coverage, it withholds that information from the insurer at risk of cancellation. Political risk insurers are supposed
to take risks and to have knowledge of local political conditions.
However, insurers may not be aware of disputes or threats that
specifically affect an investor or investment, and therefore the
investor must bring these to the attention of the insurer in the
application. 168
d.

OPIC's application

OPIC's application plays an additional role. It is important
for OPIC to obtain from the investor certain information about
statutory eligibility requirements, such as so-called "United
States effects." 169 Obtaining this data also depends substantially
upon the cooperation of the host government and can be provided for in the underlying contract.

168. See, e.g., Application for Expropriation Insurance (Permanent Investments) of
the National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa.
169. For example, the investment can not result in a significant net loss of U.S. jobs.
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Insurance Contracts

Insurance contracts can, of course, vary considerably. For
example, although the definitions of "expropriatory act" in a
sample of insurance contracts issued by OPIC, AIG and Lloyds
are basically the same, there are differences that might be crucial, given the variety of situations in which disputes over the
existence of an "expropriatory act" can arise.
1. Negotiating Insurance Contracts
Private insurers are the most flexible in negotiating contracts, even though they work from forms. They have no policy
goals to uphold. Contracts tend, therefore, to be relatively less
complicated.
The investor has, at least in principle, some flexibility to negotiate its contract with MIGA. Generally, MIGA works from
form contracts. 170 At the outset, however, the MIGA Convention
implied that MIGA should be prepared to negotiate important
terms of coverage.
OPIC prepared and promulgated simplified forms of contracts that are used for nonspecialized coverage.1 71 The contracts
were intended to simplify, not change, the previous contracts.
OPIC's policies for interpreting the contracts and managing the
claims, therefore, have not changed.17 2 It is common for OPIC
contracts to be modified to address special circumstances of the
investment, or special concerns of the investor or OPIC.
2.

Most Important Provisions

Among the most important provisions of the typical insurance contracts are the following:
a.

Definition of "expropriatory act"

The definitions in various contracts are more alike than different, although there can be some important variations. The
wording of one provision might be construed to imply that any
170. See MIGA Standard Contract reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1233 (1989).
171. OPIC 12-85 Contract, supra note 49.
172. Id.
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taking, not just an unlawful expropriatory taking, would be covered. Some provisions require total, not partial, takings. Under
OPIC's contract, for example, an investor cannot have a claim
paid and retain ownership of the underlying investment. Payment of the claim entitles OPIC to be subrogated to all of the
investor's rights. By contrast, private insurers can be more flexible with respect to partial takings.
b.

Waiting period

The "waiting period" is the time that must elapse between
the date of the expropriatory act or loss and the time when it
may be considered for compensation under the insurance contract. This is usually six to twelve months from the date of loss,
although it can vary. The provision concerning the waiting period is important for two reasons. First, an insurer can avoid
payment of a claim if the investor is restored its rights before
the end of the waiting period. Second, the insured is usually
subject to special obligations to the insurer to protect the investment during the waiting period. It is prudent for the insured to
seek to provide a basis for "restoration" and to clarify its rights
and obligations during this period. It is prudent in any event for
the insured to regularly discuss its handling of the investment
during this period with the insurer and, if possible, to obtain the
insurer's approval of any actions or omissions.
c.

Notices

An insurer is entitled to receive notice of the expropriatory
act in accordance with the insurance contract. It is to the insured's advantage to give such notice sooner rather than later,
not only because it is contractually required to do so, but also
because the insurer might play a useful role in resolving any
dispute.
d.

Warranties

The insured is required in most insurance contracts to give
certain covenants and warranties. The most common and important of these are that:
1. No material information has been withheld;
2. The insured will use all reasonable measures to prevent or
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minimize loss;
3. The insured will cooperate with the insurers;
4. The insured will take all reasonable steps, before and after
payment by the insurers of any loss, to effect recoveries of the
investment;
5. The insured has or will have obtained all necessary authorizations and licenses and will renew them in accordance with the
law;
6. The insured will preserve all remedies in the event of any
disputes;
7. The insured has complied with and will continue to comply
with laws of the host country; and
8. The uninsured percentage of loss will remain uninsured.
In addition, under OPIC's contracts, the insured agrees that
the insured and the investment will remain eligible for OPIC's
17
assistance throughout the period of insurance. 1
e.

"Sue and Labor" doctrine

As noted, a common provision in insurance contracts is that
the insured will take all reasonable steps to minimize loss or to
preserve the investment, or provisions to a similar effect. This is
often a cause of dispute between insureds and their insurers.
Such a provision reflects the general requirements of what is
called the "sue and labor" doctrine," 4 which might be imposed
upon the insured to some degree even in the absence of such a
provision. Such provisions, however, can vary considerably from
contract to contract, and the specific wording of the provision
has often been crucial to the existence of coverage in the event
17 5
of a dispute.
f.

Definition and computation of loss

This is one of the most negotiated provisions in private insurance contracts, and one that has been the focal point of a
number of disputes between insurers and the insured. Even if an
173. OPIC 12-85, supra note 49 at Arts. 9.01(0), 9.01(2), 9.01(3).
174. See, e.g., Slay Warehousing Company, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Company, 471
F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1973); Southern California Edison Co. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 148
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1978); 18 CROUNCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 74:642, at 573-74 (1968).
175. OPIC 12-85 Contract, supra note 49 at Art. 9.01(a).
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insurer is liable, the question of the extent of its liability is obviously of great importance. The definition and computation of
loss can be described specifically, as it is in OPIC's contract," 6
or it can be described briefly by reference to a particular set of
financial statements, as is sometimes the case in private contracts. A number of brokers advocate such a reference to financial statements, perhaps as calculated under generally accepted
accounting principles consistently applied in the United States
as the measure of loss. Most insurers resist this definition because, in their view, such financial statements do not always represent an accurate valuation of the investment.
g.

Exclusions

Insurance contracts provide that coverage is excluded under
certain conditions, the most common and important of which include the following:
1. Wrongful or dishonest acts or omissions of the insured;
2. Failure of the insured to take reasonable measures to prevent
an expropriatory act;
3. Material breach or inaccuracy of any representation or
warranty;
4. Failure to perform or fulfill any covenant;
5. Failure to obtain authorizations and permits; and
6. Destruction or physical damage to the property, except by act
of the host government.
In addition, private political risk contracts typically exclude
losses caused by or resulting from war.1 77 OPIC's contracts also
require that the insured caused the investment to be made and
operated in accordance with the statements made to OPIC, and
that the insured and its investment will remain eligible under
OPIC's authorizing statute.

176. OPIC 12-85 Contract, supra note 49 at Art. 5.
177. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 126, at 22. AIG's and Lloyds' war exclusion provisions exclude only changes resulting from wars involving the United States, the United
Kingdom, the old Soviet Union, France or China, wars between the country of the insured and the host country, and wars involving nuclear or thermonuclear devices.
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h. Recoveries

Insurance contracts typically provide for distribution of recoveries for loss. Typically, recoveries before the payment of a
claim can be retained by the insured and constitute a reduction
of loss. Recoveries after the end of the payment of a claim are
often shared by the insurer and the insured. Under one typical
private insurance contract, recoveries occurring after payment of
loss are shared between the insurer and the insured in the proportion to which they shared the loss. However, the recoveries
provision should also indicate how recoveries should be shared if
they are received after the end of the waiting period but before
the payment of a claim; for example, recoveries during an arbitration between the insurer and the insured over the issue of
coverage, occurring after the end of the waiting period.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In addition to a general analysis of the nature of political
risks, this article has described programs currently available for
managing them.
Although programs like OPIC and MIGA are always under
some domestic political strain, there is no reason to believe that
there will be a radical change in this decade in the prevailing
view that governments, individually and collectively, have policy
interests in stable foreign investment in developing countries. It
is also likely that the private reinsurance market will recover in
this decade, following a period of stable claims, and the private
insurers will continue to generate creative ways to manage political risks.
It is not yet clear what the end of this century and the beginning of the next portend for foreign investment in developing
countries. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War may bring
greater political stability and opportunity for economic development, for there are no remaining international ideologies that
automatically create political risks for foreign investment. The
portion of gross domestic product that went into arms in formerly communist countries can go into commercial development, but ironically, as the former communist and developing
countries increasingly embrace capitalism, the world's demand
for capital has substantially outstripped its ability to create cap-
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ital, and developing countries are competing with one another
for foreign capital. Thus, there will be a demand for foreign investment for some time to come.
On the other hand, there will surely be constraints. As former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Tip
O'Neill said (borrowing, I think, from some Victorian politician),
"all politics is local;" and local political risks will outlast communism just as assuredly as they predated it. Also, and again
ironically, as developing countries increasingly embrace open
market economics, the strains on open markets in industrialized
countries are as great as they have been in the last sixty years.
Given the right policies and a bit of luck, other elements
may emerge in this decade that can further improve the climate
for foreign investment. Many companies are becoming more sensitive in their foreign investments, thereby defusing local resentments natural to any foreign presence. More open markets in
developing countries can create classes of entrepreneurs and
capitalists that will make it difficult for local governments to revert.to state intervention. EC-92, NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations all imply that the future might include greater multilateral protection of foreign investment.
Ultimately, Polonius probably envisaged the only way to
avoid political risk: "Neither a borrower nor a lender be. ' 17 8 So
long as there are borrowers and lenders (remember that Polonius did not live to the end of the play), there will be political
risk to analyze, allocate and manage.

178. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3.
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